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Abstract—With the explosive growth in the number of pictures
taken by smartphones, organizing and searching pictures has
become important tasks. To efficiently fulfill these tasks, the
key enabler is annotating images with proper keywords, with
which keyword-based searching and organizing become available
for images. Currently, smartphones usually synchronize photo
albums with cloud storage platforms, and have their images
annotated with the help of cloud computing. However, the
“offloading-to-cloud” solution may cause privacy breach, since
photos from smart photos contain various sensitive information.
For privacy protection, existing research made effort to support
cloud-based image annotation on encrypted images by utilizing
cryptographic primitives. Nevertheless, for each annotation, it
requires the cloud to perform linear checking on the large-scale
encrypted dataset with high computational cost.
This paper proposes a cloud-assisted privacy-preserving image
annotation with randomized kd-forest, namely CPAR. With
CPAR, users are able to automatically assign keywords to their
images by leveraging the power of cloud with privacy protected.
CPAR proposes a novel privacy-preserving randomized kd-
forest structure, which significantly improves the annotation
performance compared with existing research. Thorough analysis
is carried out to demonstrate the security of CPAR. Experimental
evaluation on the well-known IAPR TC-12 dataset validates the
efficiency and effectiveness of CPAR.
Index Terms—Image Annotation, Privacy-preserving, Cloud
Computing
I. INTRODUCTION
THE widespread use of smartphones causes photographyboom in recent years. According to a recent report from
Forever’s Strategy & Business Development team [2], the
number of photos taken by smartphone is estimated to be 8.8
trillion in 2018. To facilitate the storage of photos, majority
of smartphones today are synchronizing their photo albums
with cloud storage, such as Apple’s iCloud, Samsung Cloud,
and Google Photos. Besides the storage service, these cloud
storage platforms also help annotate users’ photos with proper
keywords, which is the key enabler for users to perform
popular keyword-based search and organization over their
photos. Although the cloud storage offers a set of decent
features, it also raises privacy concerns since many users’
photos may contain sensitive information, such as personal
identities, locations, and financial information [3]. To pro-
tect the privacy of photos, encrypting them with standard
encryption algorithms, e.g., AES, is still the major approach
for privacy protection in cloud storage [4], [5]. However,
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this kind of encryption also sacrifices many other attractive
functionalities of cloud storage, especially for keyword-based
search and management for imagery files.
In order to enable keyword-based search and management
on encrypted data in cloud, keyword-based searchable en-
cryption (SE) has been widely investigated in recent years
[6]–[10]. An SE scheme typically provides encrypted search
indexes constructed based on proper keywords assigned to
data files. With these encrypted indexes, the data owner can
submit encrypted keyword-based search request to search their
data over ciphertexts. Unfortunately, these SE schemes all
assume that keywords are already available for files to be
processed, which is hard to be true for photos taken by smart-
phones. Specifically, unlike text files that support automatic
keyword extraction from their contents, keywords assignment
for imagery files relies on manual description or automatic
annotation based on a large-scale pre-annotated image dataset.
From the perspective of user experience, manually annotating
each image from users’ devices is clearly an impractical
choice. Meanwhile, automatic image annotation that involves
large-scale image datasets is too resource-consuming to be
developed on smartphones. Although currently several cloud
storage platforms offer image annotation services [11], [12],
these platforms require access to unencrypted images. There-
fore, how to provide efficient and privacy-preserving automatic
annotation for smartphones’ photos becomes the foundation
of SE schemes applications on smartphones. To address this
problem, our preliminary research proposes a scheme called
CAPIA [1]. By tailoring homomorphic encryption over vector
space, CAPIA offloads the image annotation process to the
public cloud in privacy-preserving manner. Nevertheless, for
every single annotation request, CAPIA requires the linear
processing of all encrypted records in a large-scale dataset,
which hence becomes its performance bottleneck for practical
usage.
This paper proposes a cloud-based privacy-preserving im-
age annotation scheme using the power of cloud computing
with significantly enhanced efficiency, namely CPAR. To
turbocharge the annotation efficiency with privacy protected,
CPAR designs a novel privacy-preserving randomized kd-
forest structure. Specifically, CPAR first integrates operations
for image annotation with the data search using randomized
kd-forest [13]. Then, by proposing a set of privacy-preserving
comparison schemes, CPAR enables the cloud server to per-
form image annotation directly over an encrypted randomized
kd-forest structure. Compared with the existing solution -
CAPIA, CPAR offers an adjustable speedup rate from 4× to
43.1× while achieving 97.7% to 80.3% accuracy of CAPIA.
Our privacy-preserving randomized kd-forest design can also
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2be used as independent tools for other related fields, especially
for these requiring similarity measurement on encrypted data.
Moreover, considering the same keyword may have different
importance for the semantic description of different images,
CPAR also proposes a privacy-preserving design for real-
time keywords ranking. To evaluate CPAR, thorough security
analysis and numerical analysis are carried out first. Then,
we implement a prototype of CPAR and conduct an extensive
experimental evaluation using the well-known IAPR TC-12
dataset [14]. Our evaluation results demonstrate the practical
performance of CPAR in terms of efficiency and accuracy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II: we present the system model and threat model of CPAR.
Section III introduces backgrounds of automatic image an-
notation and technical preliminaries for CPAR. The detailed
construction of CPAR is provided in Section IV. We analyze
the security of CPAR in Section V. Section VI evaluates the
performance of CPAR. We review and discuss related works
in Section VII and conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. MODELS
A. System Model
As shown in Fig.1, CAPR is composed of two entities:
a Cloud Server and a User. The user stores his/her images
on cloud, and the cloud helps the user to annotate his/her
images without learning the contents and keywords of images.
In CPAR, the user first performs a one-time system setup
that constructs an encrypted randomized kd-forest with a
pre-annotated image datasets. This encrypted randomized kd-
forest is offloaded to the cloud server to assist future privacy-
preserving image annotation. For resource-constrained mobile
devices, this one-time setup process can be performed using
desktops. Later on, when the user has a new image to annotate,
he/she generates an encrypted request and sends it to the cloud.
After processing the encrypted request, the cloud returns
ciphertexts of top related keywords and auxiliary information
to the user. Finally, the user decrypts all keywords and ranks
them based on their real-time weights to select final keywords.
 Cloud Servers
Users
Encrypted Keywords & 
Auxiliary Information
Encrypted Randomized 
KD-forest (RKDF)
Automatic Final 
Keywords Selection
Encrypted Annotation Request
?
?
?
?
One-Time Setup
Fig. 1. System Model of CPAR
B. Threat Model
In CPAR, we consider the cloud server to be “curious-
but-honest”, i.e., the cloud server will follow our scheme
to perform storage and annotation services correctly, but it
may try to learn sensitive information in user’s data. The
cloud server has access to all encrypted images, encrypted
image features, encrypted keywords, encrypted RKDF, the
user’s encrypted requests, and encrypted annotation results.
We also assume the user’s devices are fully trusted and will
not be compromised. The research on protecting user devices
is orthogonal to this work. These assumptions are consistent
with major research works that focus on search over encrypted
data on public cloud [8]–[10]. CPAR focuses on preventing the
cloud server from learning following information: 1) contents
of the user’s images; 2) features extracted and keywords
annotated for each image; 3) request linkability, i.e., tell
whether multiple annotation requests are from the same image.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Image Feature Extraction
In this paper, we adopt global low-level image features as
that are utilized in the baseline image annotation technique
[15], because it can be applied to general images without
complex models and subsequent training. Color features of
an image are extracted in three different color spaces: RGB,
HSV, and LAB. In particular, RGB feature is computed as a
normalized 3D histogram of RGB pixel, in which each channel
(R,G,B) has 16 bins that divide the color space values from 0
to 255. The HSV and LAB features can be processed similarly
as RGB, and thus we can construct three feature vectors
for RGB, HSV and LAB respectively as VRGB , VHSV , and
VLAB . Texture features of an image are extracted using Gabor
and Haar wavelets. Specifically, an image is first filtered with
Gabor wavelets at three scales and four orientations, resulting
in twelve response images. Each response image is then
divided into non-overlapping rectangle blocks. Finally, mean
filter response magnitudes from each block over all response
images are concatenated into a feature vector, denoted as
VG. Meanwhile, a quantized Gabor feature of an image is
generated using the mean Gabor response phase angle in non-
overlapping blocks in each response image. These quantized
values are concatenated into a feature vector, denoted as VGQ.
The Haar feature of an image is extracted similarly as Gabor,
but based on differently configured Haar wavelets. HaarQ
stands for the quantized version of Haar feature, which quan-
tizes Haar features into [0,-1,1] if the signs of Haar response
values are zero, negative, and positive respectively. We denote
feature vectors of Haar and HaarQ as VH and VHQ respec-
tively. Therefore, given an image, seven feature vectors will
be extracted as [VRGB ,VHSV ,VLAB ,VG,VGQ,VH ,VHQ].
For more details about the adopted image feature extraction,
please refer to ref [15].
B. Integer Vector Encryption (IVE)
In this section, we describe a homomorphic encryption
scheme designed for integer vectors [16], which will be tai-
lored in our construction to achieve privacy-preserving image
annotation. For expression simplicity, following definitions
will be used in the rest of this paper:
• For a vector V (or a matrix M), define |max(V)| (or
|max(M)|) to be the maximum absolute value of its
elements.
• For a ∈ R, define dac to be the nearest integer of a, dacq
to be the nearest integer of a with modulus q.
3• For matrix M ∈ Rn×m, define vec(M) to be a nm-
dimensional vector by concatenating the transpose of
each column of M.
Encryption: Given a m-dimensional vector V ∈ Zmp and the
secret key matrix S ∈ Zm×mq , output the ciphertext of V as
C(V) = S−1(wV + e)T (1)
where S−1 is the inverse matrix of S, T is the transpose
operator, e is a random error vector, w is an integer parameter,
q >> p, w > 2|max(e)|.
Decryption: Given the ciphertext C(V), it can be decrypted
using S and w as V = d (SC(V))Tw cq .
Inner Product: Given two ciphertexts C(V1),C(V2) of
V1,V2, and their corresponding secret keys S1 and S2, the
inner product operation of V1 and V2 over ciphertexts can be
performed as
vec(ST1 S2)d
vec(C(V1)C(V2)T )
w
cq = wV1VT2 + e (2)
To this end, vec(ST1 S2) becomes the new secret key and
d vec(C(V1)C(V2)T )w cq becomes the new ciphertext of V1VT2 .
More details about this IVE encryption algorithm and its
security proof are available in ref [16].
C. Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE)
Order-preserving symmetric encryption (OPE) is a deter-
ministic encryption scheme whose encryption function pre-
serves numerical ordering of the plaintexts. Given two integers
a and b in which a < b, by encrypting with OPE, the order
of a and b is preserved as OPE(a) < OPE(b). More details
about this OPE encryption scheme and its security proof are
available in ref [17], [18].
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF CPAR
A. Scheme Overview
The core idea of automatic image annotation is built on the
hypothesis that images contain similar objects are likely to
share keywords. The distance between the feature vectors of
two images is used to measure the probability that they contain
similar objects [15]. Given a large-scale pre-annotated image
dataset, the annotation process for a new image can be treated
as a process of finding a set of images with shared objects
and transferring keywords from those images. As a result,
the annotation efficiency becomes heavily dependent on the
performance of finding the image with shared objects. To boost
the search efficiency, CPAR adopts randomized kd-forest as
the searching index [13]. In addition, novel privacy-preserving
schemes are designed to address the privacy concerns when
integrating the randomized kd-forest into CPAR. Different
from many other index structures that are only efficient for
low-dimensional data, Randomized kd-forest (RKDF) is fea-
tured by its performance in handling high-dimensional data. In
CPAR, data vectors are over 1300-dimension and thus making
RKDF an effective selection.
As depicted in Figure 2, a RKDF is composed of a set of
parallel kd-trees. For each Nodei in a kd-tree [19], it stores a
feature vector Vi of dataset image Ii. In addition, each non-
leaf node also stores a split field si to generate a hyperplane
that divides the vector space into two parts. Each Nodej in left
sub-tree of Nodei has Nodej [si] ≤ Nodei[si] and vice versa,
as described in ref [19]. To search nodes that store vectors
with top-smallest distances to a request vector Vreq, a parallel
search among all trees in the forest is performed. Specifically,
each tree is traversed in a top-down manner by comparing the
split field values of Vreq and the vector Vi stored in each
Nodei as an example shown in Fig.2(a). The traversal selects
the left branch to continue if Vreq[si] ≤ Vi[si] and vice versa.
Once the traversal reaches a leaf node, the vector stored in
that leaf node is pushed into a priority queue Queue as a
current close candidate to Vreq. The queue push process is
shown in Fig.2(c). Note that during the search process, this
Queue keeps updating to hold L closest vectors to Vreq and
is shared by all trees in the forest. After that, a back trace
search starts by iterating all the nodes in the path from the
parent of the current node to the root node as an example
shown in Fig.2(b). When reaching a Nodei during the back
trace, a same queue push is executed to judge whether to add
Nodei to Queue as illustrated in Fig.2(c). For each Nodei
in this path, a distance comparison between Dis(Vreq,Hi)
and Dis(Vreq,VqL) is compared, where Dis(Vreq,Hi) is
the distance between Vreq and a Nodei’s hyperplane. Hi
can be considered as the projection vector of Vreq on
Nodei’s hyperplane. VqL is the Lth vector in Queue which
meets Dis(Vreq,Vqi) ≤ Dis(Vreq,VqL),∀Vqi ∈ Queue. If
Dis(Vreq,Hi) > Dis(Vreq,VqL), the back trace continues to
the next node in this path. Otherwise, the sibling branch of
Nodei needs to be searched using the top-down traversal. In
RKDF, once a node has been searched in one kd-tree, it will
be marked and does not need to be checked again in the other
trees. To further enhance the search efficiency of a RKDF,
approximated search strategy can be adopted. In particular,
based on the hypothesis that feature vectors of similar images
are likely to be grouped in the same branch, there is a high
probability that the targeted optimal top similar vectors will be
visited well before visiting all nodes in each kd-tree. In Section
VI, we will evaluate the relationship among the approximation
strength, accuracy, and efficiency. The detailed search of a
RKDF is provided in Algorithm 1. For more details about the
RKDF, please refer to ref [13].
To protect the privacy of user’s data during the cloud-based
annotation, the image data associated with the RKDF need to
be encrypted. Furthermore, these encrypted data shall support
corresponding search operations in RKDF, which include:
• The comparison between Vreq[si] and Vi[si] in the top-
down traversal for path selection.
• The comparison between Dis(Vreq,Hi) and
Dis(Vreq,VqL) during the back trace process.
• The comparison between Dis(Vreq,Va) and
Dis(Vreq,Vb), i.e., distances from the request vector to
two different images’ feature vectors, which is used in
the queue push process.
The distance Dis(·) between two vectors is calculated with a
combination of L1 distance and KL-Divergence [15]. Specif-
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ically, the distance Disab of two vectors is computed as
Disab =DL1
RGB
ab +DL1
HSV
ab +DL1
G
ab +DL1
GQ
ab
+DL1Hab +DL1
HQ
ab +DKL
LAB
ab
where each vector has seven low-level color and texture feature
vectors as discussed in Section III-A, and DL1 and DKL
denote L1 distance and KL-Divergence of two vectors after
data normalization.
In order to address the privacy challenges while utiliz-
ing RKDF for cloud-assisted automatic image annotation,
a challenge needs to be resolved: The original privacy-
preserving comparison scheme for L1 distance (PL1C) and
KL-Divergence (PKLC) in CAPIA cannot be simply re-
used in CPAR. That’s because PL1C and PKLC can only
support the privacy-preserving distance comparison between
two vectors. However, while searching in a RKDF, the distance
comparison between a vector and a hyperplane needs to be
supported in the back trace process and queue push process of
RKDF. In order to resolve this issue, we re-design PL1C and
PKLC to get PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF , standing for
PL1C and PKLC for RKDF. PL1C−RF and PKLC−RF
enable the aforementioned privacy-preserving distance com-
parison between two vectors as well as between one vector
and one hyperplane. In addition, we integrate order-preserving
encryption [17], [18] into CPAR to protect the comparison of
split field values in the top-down traversal of RKDF.
B. PL1C-RF: Privacy-preserving L1 Distance Comparison
for Randomized KD-Forest
In PL1C − RF , we consider two types of L1 distance
comparison that are required in the queue push and back
trace process of RKDF: 1) DL1ac and DL1bc for three image
feature vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}; 2) DL1hc and DL1bc for a
hyperplane projected vector Ha and two image feature vectors
Vb,Vc. DL1hc is measured by the L1 distance between Ha[sa]
and Vc[sa], where sa is the split field of the Nodea. To be more
specific, DL1hc is calculated by projecting Vc on Nodea’s
hyperplane and then calculating the L1 distance between Vc
and the projected vector Ha.
Data Preparation: Given an image feature vector Vi =
[vi1, · · · , vim], the user first converts it to a mβ-dimensional
binary vector V˜i = [F (vi1), · · · , F (vim)], where β =
|qL(Vi)|, and F (vij) = [1, 1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0] such that the
first vij terms are 1 and the rest β − vij terms are 0. The L1
distance between Va and Vb now can be calculated as
DL1ab =
∑m
j=1 |vaj − vbj | =
∑mβ
j=1(v˜aj − v˜bj)2
Then, the approximation introduced in ref [20] is applied to V˜i
to update its dimension from mβ to mˆ = αm logβ+1γ based on
the Johnson Lindenstrauss (JL) Lemma [21]. By denoting the
approximated vector as Vˆi, we have DL1ab =
∑mβ
j=1(v˜aj −
v˜bj)
2 ≈ ∑mˆj=1(vˆaj − vˆbj)2. The correctness and accuracy of
such an approximation have been proved in ref [20]. According
to our experimental evaluation in Section VI, we sets α = 1
and γ = 100 in CPAR to balance accuracy and efficiency.
The detailed construction of the rest stages in PL1C-RF is
presented in Fig.3. The user first encrypts the image feature
vectors and its corresponding hyperplane projected vector (if
exists), and then stores them in the cloud. Later on the user
can generate encrypted L1 distance comparison request and
ask the cloud to conduct privacy-preserving comparison. On
receiving the request, the cloud can conduct two types of L1
distance comparison using ciphertext only according to user’s
request.
It is worth to note that PL1C − RF is only interested in
which distance is smaller during the comparison. Therefore,
instead of letting the cloud get exact L1 distances for compar-
ison, PL1C −RF adopts approximated distance comparison
result scaled and obfuscated by rc, b − a and b − ′a as
shown in IV-B. As rc is a positive random number, the sign
of rc2 (DL1ac−DL1bc) and rc2 (DL1hc−DL1bc) are consistent
with DL1ac − DL1bc and DL1hc − DL1bc respectively.
Meanwhile, since rc >> b − a and rc >> b − ′a,
the added noise term has negligible influence to the sign of
DL1ac−DL1bc or DL1hc−DL1bc unless these two distances
5Construction of PL1C-RF
Data Encryption:
1) Append 3 elements to an approximated Vˆi as Vˆi =
[vˆi1, vˆi2, · · · , vˆimˆ, r − 12
∑mˆ
j=1 vˆ
2
ij , i,−1], i ∈ {a, b},
where r is a random number and i is a small random noise.
2) If Vˆi is stored in a non-leaf node, generate a (2mˆ +
2)-dimensional hyperplane projected vector as Hˆi =
[0, · · · , vˆisi , · · · , 0, r − 12 vˆ2isi , 
′
i, 0, · · · , 0 − 1, 0 · · · , 0],
where r − 1
2
vˆ2isi is the (mˆ + 1)th element, −1 is the
(mˆ + 2 + si)th element, and si is the split field of node
i.
3) Encrypt Vˆi and Hˆi using the Encryption algorithm of IVE as
C(Vˆi) = S−1(wVˆi+ei)T and C(Hˆi) = S
′−1(wHˆi+e
′
i)
T .
C(Vˆi),C(Hˆi), and w are outsourced to the cloud.
Request Generation:
1) Append approximated request vector Vˆc as Vˆc =
[rcvˆc1, · · · , rcvˆcmˆ, rc, 1, 12 rc
∑mˆ
j=1 vˆ
2
cj ], in which rc is a
positive random number.
2) Generate Hˆc = [rcvˆc1, · · · , rcvˆcmˆ, rc, 1, 12 rcvˆ2c1, · · · ,
1
2
rcvˆ2cmˆ] as hyperplane projected vector.
3) Vˆc and Hˆc are encrypted as C(Vˆc) = S−1c (wVˆc+ec)T and
C(Hˆc) = S
′−1
c (wHˆc + e
′
c)
T . C(Vˆc), C(Hˆc), ST Sc and
S
′T S
′
c are sent to the cloud as request.
Distance Comparison:
Type-1: Compare DL1ac, DL1bc
1) Given C(Vˆa), C(Vˆb) and C(Vˆc), compute
d vec(C(Vˆa)C(Vˆc)T )
w
cq , d vec(C(Vˆb)C(Vˆc)
T )
w
cq and decrypt
them as VˆaVˆ
T
c and VˆbVˆ
T
c as Eq.2.
2) Compare the approximated L1 distance comparison as
VˆbVˆ
T
c − VˆaVˆ
T
c ≈ rc2 (DL1ac −DL1bc) + (b − a).
Type-2: Compare DL1hc, DL1bc,
1) Given C(Hˆa), C(Vˆb), C(Vˆc) and C(Hˆc), compute
d vec(C(Hˆa)C(Hˆc)T )
w
cq , d vec(C(Vˆb)C(Vˆc)
T )
w
cq and decrypt
them as HˆaHˆ
T
c and VˆbVˆ
T
c as Eq.2.
2) Compare the approximated L1 distance comparison as
VˆbVˆ
T
c − HˆaHˆ
T
c ≈ rc2 (DL1hc −DL1bc) + (b − 
′
a).
Fig. 3. Construction of PL1C −RF
are very close to each other. Fortunately, instead of finding the
most related one, our CPAR design will utilize PL1C −RF
to figure out top 10 related candidates during the comparison.
Such a design makes important candidates (say top 5 out of
top 10) not be bypassed by the error introduced in b− a and
b−′a. This hypothesis is further validated by our experimental
results in Section VI.
C. PKLC-RF: Privacy-preserving KL-Divergence Compari-
son for Randomized KD-Forest
In PKLC − RF , we also consider two types of KL-
Divergence comparison similar to PL1C − RF : 1) DKLac
and DKLbc for three image feature vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c};
2) DKLhc and DKLbc for a hyperplane projected vector
Ha and two image feature vectors Vb,Vc. Given two m-
dimensional vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b}, their KL-Divergence
DKLab is calculated as
DKLab =
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(vaj
vbj
) (3)
=
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(vaj)−
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(vbj)
where log( vajvbj ) = log(vaj) = log(vbj) = 0 if vaj = 0 or
vbj = 0. In addition, the KL-Divergence DKLhc between a
image feature vector and a hyperplane is measured by the KL-
Divergence between Ha[sa] and Vc[sa], where sa is the split
field of Nodea. Similar with PL1C−RF , PKLC−RF is also
calculated by projecting Vc on Nodea’s hyperplane and then
calculating the KL-Divergence between Vc and the projected
vector Ha.
The detailed construction of PKLC − RF is presented
in Fig.4. In the data encryption stage, the image feature
vectors and corresponding hyperplane projected vector (if
exists) are encrypted and stored in the cloud. On receiving
the encrypted KL-Divergence comparison request from the
user, the cloud conducts two types of privacy-preserving KL-
Divergence comparison using ciphertext only according to
user’s request. Similar to our PL1C construction, we have
rc > 0 and rc >> (b − a). Therefore, the cloud can figure
out which KL-Divergence is smaller based on the scaled and
obfuscated comparison result.
D. Detailed Construction of CPAR
CPAR consists of five major procedures. In the System
Setup, the user selects system parameters, extracts, pre-
processes feature vectors of images in a pre-annotated dataset
and uses these feature vectors to build a RKDF. Then, the user
executes the RKDF Encryption procedure to encrypt all data
associated with nodes in the RKDF. Both the System Setup
procedure and the RKDF Encryption procedure are one-time
cost in CPAR. Later on, the user can use the Secure Anno-
tation Request procedure to generate an encrypted annotation
request. On receiving the request, the cloud server performs the
Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud procedure to return
encrypted keywords for the requested image. At the end, the
user obtains final keywords by executing the Final Keyword
Selection procedure.
1) System Setup: To perform the one-time setup of CPAR
system, the user first prepares a pre-annotated image dataset
with n images, which can be obtained from public sources,
such as IAPR TC-12 [14], LabelMe [22], etc. For each
image Ii in the dataset, the user extracts seven feature
vectors [Vi,RGB ,Vi,HSV ,Vi,LAB ,Vi,G,Vi,GQ,Vi,H ,Vi,HQ].
Compared with other five feature vectors that have dimension
up to 256, Vi,H and Vi,HQ have a high dimension as 4096.
To guarantee the efficiency while processing feature vectors,
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [23] is utilized to reduce
the dimension of Vi,H and Vi,HQ. According to our exper-
imental evaluation in Section VI-C, PCA-based dimension
reduction with proper setting can significantly improve the
efficiency of CPAR with slight accuracy loss. After that,
6Construction of PKLC-RF
Data Encryption:
1) Given an image feature vector Vi, append m + 2 elements
as Vi = [vi1, vi2, · · · , vim, vi1 × log(vi1), · · · , vim ×
log(vim), r, i], where r is a random number and i is
a small random noise. If Vi is stored in a non-leaf node
in RKDF, its corresponding hyperplane projected vector
is processed as Hi = [0, · · · , visi , · · · , 0, · · · , visi ×
log(visi ), · · · , 0, r, 
′
i], where si is the split field of the node,
visi , visi × log(visi ) and r are the sith, (m + si)th and
(2m+ 1)th elements respectively.
2) Encrypt Vi and Hi with the Encryption algorithm of IVE as
C(Vi) = S−1(wVi+ei)T and C(Hi) = S−1(wHi+e
′
i)
T .
Request Generation:
1) Given request image feature vector Vc, replace its ele-
ments vcj with −rc × log(vcj) and append m + 2 el-
ements to it as Vc = [−rc × log(vc1), · · · ,−rc ×
log(vcm), G(vc1), · · · , G(vcm), rc,−1], where G(vcj) ={
rc, vcj 6= 0
0, vcj = 0
, rc is a positive random number changing for
every request.
2) Using the Encryption algorithm of IVE to encrypt Vc as
C(Vc) = S−1c (wVc + ec)T . C(Vc) and ST Sc are sent to
the cloud as request.
KL-Divergence Comparison:
Type-1: Compare DKLac, DKLbc
1) Compute d vec(C(Va)C(Vc)T )
w
cq , d vec(C(Vb)C(Vc)
T )
w
cq and
decrypts them as VaVTc and VbVTc using the Decryption of
IVE in Section III-B.
2) Compare KL divergence as VaVTc −VbVTc = rc(DKLac−
DKLbc) + (b − a).
Type-2: Compare DKLhc, DKLbc
1) Compute d vec(C(Ha)C(Vc)T )
w
cq , d vec(C(Vb)C(Vc)
T )
w
cq and
decrypts as HaVTc and VbVTc using the Decryption of IVE
as Eq.2.
2) Compare KL divergence as HaVTc −VbVTc = rc(DKLhc−
DKLbc) + (b − ′a).
Fig. 4. Construction of PKLC-RF
L1 normalization will be performed for each feature vec-
tor, which normalizes elements in these vectors to [-1,1].
Besides Vi,LAB , the user also increases each element in
Vi,k, k ∈ {RGB,HSV,G,GQ,H,HQ} as vi,k,j = vi,k,j+1
to avoid negative values. Six feature vectors that use L1
distance for similarity measurement are concatenated as a
mL1-dimensional vector Vi,L1. Vi,LAB is denoted as a mKL-
dimensional vector Vi,KL for expression simplicity. It is easy
to verify that DL1L1ab = DL1
RGB
ab + DL1
HSV
ab + DL1
G
ab +
DL1GQab +DL1
H
ab +DL1
HQ
ab .
After that, a RKDF is constructed with feature vector space
{Vi}1≤i≤n, in which each node in a single tree is associated
with one Vi. For each non-leaf node in RKDF, its split field
element Vi[si] is stored in a set SF . In CPAR, the RKDF
contains ten parallel kd-trees.
2) RKDF Encryption: Given an image Ii in the pre-
annotated dataset, its keywords {Ki,t} are first encrypted using
AES. Then, its processed feature vectors Vi,L1,Vi,KL are
encrypted with our PL1C−RF and PKLC−RF schemes as
C(Vi,L1) and C(Vi,KL) respectively. C(Vi,L1) and C(Vi,KL)
are then stored in the corresponding Nodei of the RKDF. For
each non-leaf node, encrypted hyperplane projected vectors
C(Hi,L1),C(Hi,KL) are generated and added into Nodei using
the data encryption processes described in our PL1C − RF
and PKLC − RF . In addition, for the split field element
Vi[si] of each non-leaf node, an order-preserving encryption
is executed and the ciphertext OPE(Vi[si]) is stored in Nodei.
After the encryption, each node in the RKDF only contains
encrypted data as
• Non-leaf Node: [C(Vi,L1),C(Vi,KL),C(Hi,L1),C(Hi,KL),
OPE(Vi[si]), AES({Ki,t})]
• Leaf Node: [C(Vi,L1),C(Vi,KL), AES({Ki,t})]
During the encryption process, same secret keys SL1, S
′
L1,
SKL, public parameter w, and random number r will be used
for all images. However, different error vector ei, e
′
i and noise
term i, 
′
i are generated for each image Ii correspondingly.
The user also computes STL1Ss,L1, S
′T
L1S
′
s,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL,
in which Ss,L1, S
′
s,L1 and Ss,KL are secret keys for the
encryption of later annotation requests. The encrypted RKDF,
STL1Ss,L1, S
′T
L1S
′
s,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL are outsourced to the
cloud.
3) Secure Annotation Request: When the user has a new
image Is for annotation, he/she first extracts seven feature vec-
tors as Vs, s ∈ [RGB,HSV,LAB,G,GQ,H,HQ]. These
vectors will be processed to output Vs,L1 and Vs,KL as that in
the System Setup procedure. Vs,L1 and Vs,KL are encrypted as
C(Vs,L1), C(Hs,L1), and C(Vs,KL) using the Request Gener-
ation of PL1C−RF and PKLC−RF schemes respectively.
For each annotation request, the user generates a new positive
random number rs and new error vectors es, e
′
s. Meanwhile,
for each element sfj in the split field set SF generated in
System Setup, the user encrypts Vs[sfj ] using order-preserving
encryption as OPE(Vs[sfj ]). C(Vs,L1), C(Hs,L1), C(Vs,KL)
and {OPE(Vs[sfj ])} are sent to the cloud as the annotation
request.
4) Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud: On receiving
the encrypted request, the cloud first performs a privacy-
preserving search over the encrypted RKDF. As described in
Algorithm 1, the cloud conducts parallel search over each
encrypted tree in the RKDF. There are three places that
require the cloud to conduct privacy-preserving computation
over encrypted data:
• During the top-down traversal, as the split field element
of each non-leaf node is encrypted using order-preserving
encryption, the cloud can directly compare their ciphertexts
(line 7) to determine which node to be checked next.
• In the back trace process, the cloud needs to perform
privacy-preserving comparison to determine whether the cur-
rent node’s sibling branch needs to be searched (line 24
to 29). In particular, given C(Vs,L1), C(Hs,L1), C(VqL,L1),
C(Hparent,L1), C(Vs,KL), C(VqL,KL), and C(Hparent,KL),
the cloud first uses type-2 distance comparison in PL1C−RF
and PKLC −RF to compute
VqL,L1VTs,L1, VqL,KLV
T
s,KL,
Hparent,L1HTs,L1, Hparent,KLV
T
s,KL
7Then, the distance comparison is executed as
CompqL = −2(VqL,L1VTs,L1) + VqL,KLVTs,KL
Comph = −2(Hparent,L1HTs,L1) + Hparent,KLVTs,KL
CompqL − Comph (4)
= rs(DL1
L1
qL,s −DL1L1parent,s) + 2(
′
parent − qL)
+rs(DKL
LAB
qL,s −DKLLABparent,s) + (
′
parent − qL)
= rs(Dis(VqL,Vs)−Dis(Hparent,Vs))
+3(
′
parent − qL)
where VqL is the least closest vector to Vreq in priority queue
Queue. As rs is a positive value and rs >> (
′
parent −
qL), the sign of CompqL − Comph is consistent with
Dis(VqL,Vs)−Dis(Hparent,Vs).
• In the Queue push process (line 30-37), privacy-
preserving distance comparison is needed to determine
whether a new node shall be added. Specifically,
given C(Vs,L1), C(VNode,L1), C(VqL, L1), C(Vs,KL),
C(VNode,KL), C(VqL,KL), the cloud use type-1 distance
comparison in PL1C − RF and PKLC − RF to perform
distance comparison as
CompNode = −2(VNode,L1VTs,L1) + VNode,KLVTs,KL
CompqL = −2(VqL,L1VTqL,L1) + Vcur,KLVTs,KL
CompNode − CompqL (5)
= rs(DL1
L1
Node,s −DL1L1qL,s) + 2(qL − Node)
+rs(DKL
LAB
Node,s −DKLLABqL,s ) + (qL − Node)
= rs(Dis(VNode,Vs)−Dis(VqL,Vs))
+3(qL − Node)
To this end, the cloud is able to perform all operations
required by a RKDF search in the privacy-preserving manner,
and obtain a Queue of nodes that stores data of top related
images to the request. The cloud returns distance comparison
candidates (type-1 distance) Compi, i ∈ Queue as well as
corresponding encrypted keywords back to the user.
5) Final Keyword Selection: The user first decrypts en-
crypted keywords and obtains Ki,t, i ∈ Queue, where Ki,t
is the t-th pre-annotated keyword in image Ii. Then, the user
computes distances Dis(Vi,Vs), i ∈ Queue as
Dis(Vi,Vs) = (2r +
∑mL1
j=1 v
2
s,L1,j) +
Compi
rs
(6)
= (2r +
∑mL1
j=1 v
2
s,L1,j) +
−2(Vi,L1VTs,L1)+Vi,KLVTs,KL
rs
To achieve higher accuracy in keywords selection, we consider
that keywords in images that have smaller distance to the
requested one are more relevant. Thus, we define a real-time
weight Wt for each keyword based on distances Dis(Vi,Vs)
as
WIi = 1−
Dis(Vi,Vs)∑
i∈RST Dis(Vi,Vs)
(7)
Wt =
∑
WIi , for Ii contains Ki,t (8)
Specifically, we first figure out the weight WIi of each image
according to their distance-based similarity. As our definition
in Eq.7, images with smaller distance will receive a larger
weight value. Then, considering the same keyword can appear
in multiple images, the final weight Wt of a keyword Ki,t
is generated by adding weights of images that contain this
keyword. Finally, the user selects keywords for his/her image
according to their ranking of weight Wt.
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving RKDF Search
Input : Encrypted Search Request (Req) for Vs, Encrypted
RKDF with a set of Trees {Tk}, approximation power
AP − X
Output: Encrypted Nodes Associated with Top Related Images
to the Request.
1 Initialization Queue = [], Path = [] (Searched Path), V is = []
(Visited Nodes), Nodek=Tk.root;
2 Each tree Tk executes topDownTraversal() and
backTraceSearch() in parallel, Queue and V is are shared
among all trees;
3 Function topDownTraversal(Req, Nodek):
4 if Nodek is not null then
5 return;
6 Vi ←− Nodek.Vi;
7 if OPE(Vs[si]) ≤ OPE(Vi[si]) then
8 Nodek = topDownTraversal(Nodek.left-child);
9 else
10 Nodek = topDownTraversal(Nodek.right-child);
11 if Nodek 6∈ V is then
12 V is.push(Nodek);
13 Queue.push(Nodek);
14 Path.push(Nodek);
15 return Nodek;
16 Function backTraceSearch(Req, Nodek):
17 if V is.length() > AP − X× Nodes Number then
18 return Queue;
19 if Path is not null then
20 parent←− Path.pop();
21 if parent 6∈ V is then
22 V is.push(parent);
23 Queue.push(parent);
24 //Privacy-preserving distance comparison is achieved by
PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF , VqL is the least closest
vector to Vs in Queue
25 if Dis(VqL,Vs) < Dis(Hparent,Vs)) then
26 backTraceSearch(Req, parent);
27 else
28 Nodek = topDownTraversal(Req,Nodek.sibling);
29 return Queue;
30 Function Queue.push(Node):
31 //Each Nodeq in Queue are ordered by Dis(Vs,VNodeq )
32 if Queue.length() < Defined Size L then
33 Add Node into Queue by order;
34 else
35 if NodeqL in Queue has
Dis(Vs,VNode) < Dis(Vs,VqL) then
36 Remove NodeqL from Queue;
37 Add Node into Queue by order;
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In CPAR, we have the following privacy related data: feature
vectors {Vi,L1,Vi,KL}1≤i≤n, hyperplane projected vectors
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Fig. 5. Error rate of Approximation and Dimension of Approximated Vector (PCA− 32)
Hi,L1, Hi,KL of each non-leaf node associated with Vi,L1,
Vi,KL, the split field element of each non-leaf node, keywords
of image Ii in the pre-annotated dataset, and feature vectors
Vs,L1, Hs,L1, Vs,KL of the image requested for annotation.
As keywords are encrypted using standard AES encryption,
we consider them secure against the cloud server as well as
outside adversaries. For the split field element of each non-
leaf node, it is encrypted using the order-preserving encryption
[17], [18], which has been proved to be secure. With regards
to Vi,L1, Hi,L1, Vi,KL, Hi,KL, Vs,L1, Hs,L1 Vs,KL, they are
encrypted using the encryption scheme of IVE [16] after pre-
processing as presented in our PL1C−RF and PKLC−RF
schemes. The IVE scheme [16] has been proved to be secure
based on the well-known Learning with Errors (LWE) hard
problem [24]. Thus, given the ciphertexts C(Vi,L1), C(Hi,L1),
C(Vi,KL), C(Hi,KL), C(Vs,L1), C(Hs,L1), C(Vs,KL) only,
it is computational infeasible for the cloud server or outside
adversaries to recover the corresponding feature vectors.
A. Security of Outsourcing STL1Ss,L1, S
′T
L1S
′
s,L1 and
STKLSs,KL
As STL1Ss,L1, S
′T
L1S
′
s,L1, and S
T
KLSs,KL are used in the
same manner, we use STSs to denote them for expression
simplicity. Different from the original encryption algorithm of
IVE, the user in CPAR also outsources STSs to the cloud
besides ciphertexts. As all elements in S and Ss are randomly
selected, elements in their multiplication STSs have the same
distribution as these elements in S and Ss [25]. Thus, given
STSs, the cloud server is not able to extract S or Ss directly
and use them to decrypt ciphertexts. By combining STSs with
ciphertexts C(Vi,L1) and C(Vs,L1) (same as that for C(Hi,L1),
C(Hs,L1), C(Vi,KL), C(Hi,KL) and C(Vs,KL)), the cloud can
obtain
STSsC(Vi,L1) = STSsS−1(wVi,L1 + ei)T
STSsC(Vs,L1) = STSsS−1s (wVs,L1 + es)
T
= ST (wVs,L1 + es)T
From the above two equations, it is clear that the combination
of STSs, C(Vi,L1) and STSs, C(Vs,L1) only transfer them to
the ciphertexts of Vi,L1 and Vs,L1 that encrypted using the
IVE scheme with new keys STSsS−1 and ST respectively. As
STSsS−1 and ST are random keys and unknown to the cloud,
recovering Vi,L1, Vs,L1 from STSsC(Vi,L1), STSsC(Vs,L1)
still become the LWE problem as proved in ref [16]. To this
end, STSs only helps the cloud perform distance comparison
in CPAR, but does not bring additional advantages to recover
feature vectors compared with the given ciphertexts only
scenario.
B. Request Unlinkability
The request unlinkability in CPAR is guaranteed by the
randomization for each request. Specifically, each query
request {Vs,L1,Hs,L1,Vs,KL} is element-wise obfuscated
with different random error terms es, e
′
s and random num-
ber rs during the encryption, which makes the obfuscated
Vs,L1,Hs,L1,Vs,KL have the same distribution as in these
random values es, e
′
s and rc [25]. Thus, by changing es, e
′
s and
rc during the encryption of different requests, CPAR outputs
different random ciphertexts, even for requests generated from
the same image.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of CPAR, we implemented a
prototype using Python 2.7. In our implementation, Numpy
[26] is used to support efficient multi-dimension array opera-
tions. OpenCV [27] is used to extract the color-space features
of the images and build the filter kernels to generate the
Gabor filter results. Pywt [28] is adopted to perform Haar
wavelet and get the corresponding Haar results. Sklearn [29]
is used to perform the PCA transformation. FLANN library
[13] is used to act as the non-privacy randomized kd-forest for
comparison. We use the well-known IAPR TC-12 [14] as the
pre-annotated dataset, which contains 20,000 annotated images
and the average number of keywords for each image is 5.7. All
tests are performed on a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 Macbook Pro
with OS X 10.14.2 installed as User and a Microsoft Azure
cloud E4-v3 VM with Ubuntu 18.04 LTS installed as Cloud
Server.
In the rest of this section, n is the total number of images
in the pre-annotated dataset, mL1 is the dimension of pre-
processed feature vectors Vi,L1, mKL is the dimension of
pre-processed feature vectors Vi,KL and their corresponding
hyperplane projected vectors Hi,KL, m
′
L1 is the dimensions
of hyperplane projected vector Hi,L1. We also use DOTm to
denote a dot product operation between to two m-dimensional
vectors. AP −X is used to denote the approximation power
during the RKDF search, which indicates X% of the nodes
will be checked in each tree of RKDF. PCA−X is used to
denote the strength of PCA transformation applied to Vi,H
and Vi,HQ in Vi,L1, which compresses their dimensions from
4096 to 4096X . PCA−128, PCA−64, PCA−32, PCA−16,
9and PCA− 8 are evaluated in our experiments to balance the
efficiency and accuracy of CAPIA.
In our evaluation, we first provide numerical analysis as well
as experimental evaluation for each stage of CPAR. Then, we
compare CPAR with CAPIA proposed in ref [1] in terms of
efficiency and accuracy.
A. System Parameter Selection
To perform the one-time setup in CPAR, the user pre-
processes feature vectors of each image in the pre-annotated
image dataset. Specifically, the user first performs JL-Lemma
based approximation over Vi,L1 to make them compatible
with our PL1C − RF . As discussed in Section IV-B, there
is a trade-off between the approximation accuracy of L1
distance and length of the approximated vector that deter-
mines efficiency of follow up privacy-preserving operations.
To balance such a trade-off, we evaluate different parameters
for approximation as shown in Fig.5 (a)-(d). According to our
results, we suggest to set α = 1 and γ = 100 which introduces
3.61% error rate for L1 distance computation, and extends
the dimension of Vi,L1 from 864 to 1296 under the setting
of PCA − 32. Specifically, the error rate drops fast when
α < 1 and becomes relative stable when α > 1. Meanwhile,
the dimension of the approximated vector increases linearly
to the value of α. With regards to γ, the dimension of the
approximated vector becomes relative stable when γ > 100,
however, the error rate still increases when γ > 100.
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Fig. 6. Accuracy Loss with Different PCA Settings
With regards to the selection of PCA parameter, it is clear
that better efficiency of CPAR will be achieved by increasing
the strength of PCA. However, the stronger PCA setting will
also cause accuracy loss due to the loss of information during
the compression. To balance the efficiency and accuracy, we
evaluate of accuracy loss of annotation with different PCA
setting. Compared with the No − PCA setting, Fig.6 shows
the accuracy loss for PCA − 8, PCA − 16, and PCA − 32
are stable and bounded in 0.5%. Differently, PCA − 64 and
PCA−128 rapidly raise the accuracy loss. Therefore, PCA−
32 is adopted by CPAR.
B. RKDF Construction and Encryption
To construct an encrypted RKDF, the user first constructs
an unencrypted RKDF using 20,000 pre-annotated images,
and then replaces data of each node in the RKDF with their
corresponding ciphertexts. The construction of an unencrypted
RKDF with 10 kd-trees costs 28.56 seconds. Then, for the pre-
processed feature vectors Vi,L1 and Vi,KL of each image, the
user can encrypt them using PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF
with (mL1)DOTmL1 and (mKL)DOTmKL operations respec-
tively, which costs 8.4ms in total in our implementation. If an
image is associated with a non-leaf node in any tree of the
RKDF, encryption for the hyperplane projected vectors Hi,L1
and Hi,KL with (m
′
L1)DOTm′L1
and (mKL)DOTmKL opera-
tions respectively, which costs 54.7ms in total. In addition, for
each non-leaf node, an order-preserving encryption is needed
for the split field, each of which costs 1.4ms. Therefore, to
build a 10-tree encrypted RKDF with a 20,000 pre-annotated
image dataset, it takes 74.78 minutes in our implementation.
It is noteworthy that the encrypted RKDF construction is one-
time offline cost, which does not impact the performance of
later on real-time privacy-preserving image annotation.
C. Real-time Image Annotation
Request Generation: To annotate a new image in a privacy-
preserving manner, the user pre-processes and encrypts its
feature vectors Vs,L1 and Vs,KL using PL1C − RF and
PKLC − RF . Specifically, the encryption of Vs,L1 requires
(mL1)DOTmL1+(m
′
L1)DOTm′L1
for shown in Fig.3, and the
encryption of Vs,KL requires (mKL)DOTmKL operations as
shown in Fig.4. In addition, for each element sfj in the split
field element set SF with size of 348 in our implementation,
order-preserving encryption are executed for Vs[sfj ]. As a
result, the encrypted request can be efficiently generated with
only 534.16ms.
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Fig. 7. Privacy-preserving Annotation Cost on Cloud with Different Approx-
imation Power
Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud: On receiving
the encrypted request, the cloud performs privacy-preserving
RKDF search with top-down traversal, back trace search, and
queue push processes. The top-down traversal only requires
a direct comparison between the ciphertexts under order-
preserving encryption, whose cost is negligible compared with
the other two processes. In the back trace search, privacy-
preserving type-2 distance comparison needs to the executed
using PL1C − RF and PKLC − RF . In particular, two
comparison candidates CompqL and Comph are computed
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Fig. 8. Speedup Rate with Different Approximation Power
with (mL1 + 1)DOTmL1 + (mKL + 1)DOTmKL operations
and (m
′
L1 + 1)DOTm′L1
+ (mKL + 1)DOTmKL operations
respectively. With regards to the queue push process, privacy-
preserving type-1 distance comparison are executed using
PL1C − RF and PKLC − RF , which requires 2(mL1 +
1)DOTmL1 + 2(mKL + 1)DOTmKL operations in total. An-
other important parameter that affects the search efficiency is
the selection of approximation power AP − X . As depicted in
Fig.7, by increasing the approximation power from AP−100
to AP−2.5, the privacy-preserving annotation using encrypted
RKDF reduces from 143.72 seconds to 2.98 seconds. Com-
pared with CAPIA [1] that requires 218.46 seconds for one
privacy-preserving annotation on cloud and does not support
approximate dataset checking, CPAR can significantly speed
it up as depicted in Fig.8.
Final Keyword Selection: This process only involves AES
decryption and the weights generation that only requires a
small number of additions. As a result, the final keyword
selection can be completed by the user within 318ms.
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Fig. 9. Accuracy (Recall) of CPAR with Different Approximation Power
Accuracy: To evaluate the accuracy of CPAR, we use the
standard average recall rates to measure the accuracy of key-
words annotation. To be specific, by using [K1,K2, · · · , ...Ky]
to denote distinct keywords annotated with CPAR for a set of
image annotation requests, the recall rate for each keyword
Kj and the average accuracy are defined as
• recallKj =
# of images assigned Kj correctly by CPAR
# of images assigned Kj in the ground−truth
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CAPIA
• Accuracy =
∑y
j=1 recallKj
y
In our evaluation, annotation requests for 50 different im-
ages are submitted, in which each requested image has two or
more related images in the pre-annotated dataset. As shown in
Fig.9, the accuracy of CPAR reduces from 88.42% to 67.59%
when the approximation power increases from AP − 100 to
AP−2.5. Compared with CAPIA [1] our scheme achieves
the same accuracy by setting the approximation power as
AP − 100. While the increasing of approximation power
reduces the accuracy of CPAR to some extent, it also boosts
the efficiency significantly as shown in Fig.7. Compared with
CAPIA, Fig.10 shows that CPAR can speed up CAPIA by
4×, 11.5×, 18.7×, 25.8×, 43.1× when achieving 97.7%,
91.4%, 88.9%, 84.7%, 80.3% accuracy of CAPIA respectively.
Therefore, CPAR can greatly promote the efficiency the of
CAPIA while retaining comparable accuracy. To balance the
efficiency speedup and annotation accuracy of CPAR, we
suggest to set the approximation power as AP − 10, i.e.
achieves 88.9% accuracy of CAPIA with 18.7× speedup.
In Table I, we present samples of automatically annotated
images using CAPIA and CPAR with approximation power
as AP − 10. In the last column we list the human annotation
results (ground-truth) for comparison. On one hand, CPAR is
highly possible to assign correct keywords to images com-
pared with human annotation. This observation also confirms
the high average recall rate of CPAR, since these ground-
truth annotations are likely to be covered in CPAR. On the
other hand, CPAR also introduces additional keywords that
frequently appear together with these accurate keywords in
top related images. These additional keywords are typically
not directly included in human annotations, but are potentially
related to correct keywords. Compared with CAPIA, CPAR
only misses a small portion of ground-truth keywords due
to the approximation strategy, which is consistence with our
evaluation result in Fig.9 and Fig.10. Overall, our evaluation
results demonstrate that although CPAR cannot provide perfect
keywords selection all the time compared with human annota-
tion, it can still maintain comparable accuracy as CAPIA and
is promising for automatically assigning keywords to images.
Communication Cost: The communication cost in CPAR
comes from two major parts: annotation request and encrypted
11
TABLE I
SAMPLE ANNOTATION RESULTS
Image CPAR Annotation CAPIA Annotation Human Annotation
floor-tennis-court, man, grass floor-tennis-court, man, woman floor-tennis-court, man
highway, sky-blue, trees, vegetation,
ground, ship, sky, ocean, bush
sky-blue, highway, vegetation,
ground, bush, trees, lake, ocean
highway, sky-blue,
trees, vegetation
group-of-persons, ground, cloud, man, sky-light,
mountain, door, chair, floor-other, column
cloud, sky-blue, ground,
mountain, horse man, road, grass
ground, cloud, sky-blue,
mountain, snow, grass
group-of-persons, hat, hill, cloud, sky-blue,
ground, sky, fabric, couple-of-persons, grass
group-of-persons, sky-blue, ground, trees,
mountain, ruin-archeological, hat, cloud, hill
trees, ground, man,
sky-blue, group-of-persons
In each cell of CPAR and CAPIA annotation results, ground-truth human annotation results are underlined and bold out.
results returned from the cloud server. The encrypted request
consists of a mL1-dimensional vector C(Vs,L1), a m
′
L1-
dimensional vector C(Hs,L1), a mKL-dimensional vector
C(Vs,KL) and a set of encrypted split field elements SF .
In the PCA− 32 setting, the total communication cost for a
request is 80KB, in which 26KB for C(Vs), 48KB for C(Hs)
and 4KB for SF . Meanwhile, the returned results contain
encrypted keywords and distance comparison candidates of top
10 related images. Using AES-256 for keywords encryption,
the total size for the returned result is 488 Bytes with the
average number of keywords for each pre-annotated image
as 5.7. Therefore, the communication cost for each privacy-
preserving annotation can be efficiently handled in today’s
Internet environment.
VII. RELATED WORKS
To solve the problem of how to search over encrypted
data, the idea of keyword-based searchable encryption (SE)
was first introduced by Song et.al in ref [6]. Later on, with
the widespread use of cloud storage services, the idea of SE
received increasing attention from researchers. In ref [7], [8],
search efficiency enhanced SE schemes are proposed based
on novel index constructions. After that, SE schemes with
the support of multiple keywords and conjunctive keywords
are investigated in ref [9], and thus making the search more
accurate and flexible. Recently, fuzzy keyword is considered in
ref [10], which enables SE schemes to tolerate misspelled key-
word during the search process. While these SE schemes offer
decent features for keyword-based search, their application to
images are limited given the question that how keywords of
images can be efficiently extracted with privacy protection.
It is impractical for cloud storage users to manually annotate
their images.
To automate the keywords extraction process for images, a
number of research works have been proposed with the con-
cept of “automatic image annotation” [15], [30]–[32]. Chapelle
et al. [33] trained support vector machine (SVM) classifiers
to achieve high annotation accuracy where the only available
image features are high dimensional histograms. In ref [34],
[35], SVM was used to learn regional information as well as
helped segmentation and classification process simultaneously.
Different from SVM which works by finding a hyperplane to
separate vector spaces, Bayesian network accomplishes the
annotation tasks by modeling the conditional probabilities
from training samples. In ref [36], [37], Bayesian networks
were built by clustering global image features to calculate
the conditional probabilities. Another widely used technique is
artificial neural network (ANN). Take ref [38] as an instance,
based on the assumption that after image segmentation, the
largest part of an image significantly characterizes the entire
image, Park et al. annotated images using a 3-layer ANN. With
the flourish of deeper ANN structures, such as convolutional
neural network (CNN), in various vision tasks [39]–[41], these
deeper frameworks have also been applied to image annotation
tasks. In ref [42], Yunchao et al. proposed to solve image
annotation problem by training CNN with rankings. Jian et
al. [43] combined CNN with recurrent neural network (RNN)
to address the problem of the keyword dependency during
annotation. However, all of these image annotation works raise
privacy issues when delegated to the cloud since unencrypted
images need to be outsourced. Therefore, to address such
privacy concerns, this paper proposes CPAR, which utilizes
the power of cloud computing to perform automatic image
annotation for users, while only providing encrypted image
information to the cloud.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose CPAR that enables privacy-
preserving image annotation using public cloud servers. CPAR
uniquely integrates randomized kd-forest with a privacy-
preserving design, and thus boosting the annotation efficiency
using cloud. Specifically, CPAR proposes the lightweight
privacy-preserving L1 distance PL1C − RF and KL-
Divergence PKLC − RF comparison schemes, and then
utilizes them together with order-preserving encryption to
support all required operations in image annotation and ran-
domized kd-forest search. Our PL1C−RF , PKLC−RF and
privacy-preserving randomized kd-forest can also be utilized
as independent tools for other related fields, especially for
efficient similarity measurement on encrypted data. Thorough
security analysis is provided to show that CPAR is secure in
the defined threat model. Extensive numerical analysis as well
12
as prototype implementation over the well-known IAPR TC-
12 dataset demonstrate the practical performance of CPAR in
terms of efficiency and accuracy.
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